És most két történet a túloldalról, a személyes szempontok. Az első hosszú írás, Holly Barnes Higginstől, aki USAID/Chemonics megbízásból ment Lashkar Gahba (Helmand), hogy: As the public information specialist for the project, implemented by Chemonics International, Inc. (a for-profit contractor of USAID), I was responsible for creating and implementing a public education campaign to inspire local citizens to commit themselves to economic progress (and in the process repudiate the poppy).
Ambíciózus nem? A hölgy őszintén leírja, a terv hiábavalóságát, a kényszert, hogy a USAID vagy a saját végük felé micsoda sikertörténeteket kellett írniuk, milyen lehetetlen volt a biztonsági környezet, de legfőkébb , hogy micsoda lelkileg deprimáló volt a környezet és ez hogy morzsolta fel az embereket. Volt, hogy valaki elfelejtett visszatérni a szabadságáról, az expat személyzet egyre antiszociálisabb lett, a afgán munaktársak egy re kevésbé merték vállalni a munkát a a külföldiekkel. A Chemonics egy helyi narko-hadúrtól bérelte a palotát, amiben az emberek el voltak szállásolva. A IED veszély állandó volt, korábban a cég 11 emberét vesztette el egy támadásban, akik egy helyi alternatív megélhetési projekten dolgoztak.
Két finom példa arra, hogy mennyire szabad bízni a helyi hatalmasságok terveiben: Every so often, a bright spot reinvigorated me and sometimes even the team as a whole. Not long after the danger pay increase, the project successfully undertook some innovative work involving several Bolivian engineers and laborers. Inspired by a similar licit-livelihoods project in Bolivia, we introduced the ancient and artful technology of cobblestone road-building to Helmand. The provincial governor and other local leaders had insisted on paved asphalt as part of infrastructure development, but they agreed to a one-kilometer demonstration project. Project leaders calculated that, given the capital/labor ratios available, stone roads were much cheaper than asphalt and more durable. Bolivian experts, protected by a cadre of Afghan and Nepalese security guards, taught 46 Afghan men (paid $4 per day) how to quarry and build the road. Despite not having a language in common, the project worked well and it was a beautiful thing to behold: the partnership and each new extension of the road itself. The one-kilometer experiment was completed in approximately two months, and we held a ceremony at a well-fortified site following a heavily guarded tour with U.S. Ambassador Ronald Neumann and other U.S. and Afghan officials. The Afghans were clearly proud of their achievement. Another seven-kilometer stretch was soon approved, bringing the road all the way into Lashkar Gah.
A másik: Not long before I left Helmand, I was asked to staff a major Counter-Narcotics Shura, or council of elders. While initiated by U.S. officials after a meeting with British counter-narcotics and communications consultants, we framed the shura as an idea of Helmand’s newest governor, Engineer Daoud, as he was called in the local vernacular. Hosszú készűlődés, a különböző afgán notabilitások beszédének előkészítése, adatok előbányászása, a beszéd felépítése stb után: The men in the room had been told to leave the front row for the Westerners. Awkwardly, we suggested that Afghans sit in the front, but soon realized that they saw themselves as hosts—we were their guests. So we sat. Afghan state media—radio and television—were present, and despite knowing several of them from my contacts made over the year, they clearly did not want to associate with me. In this setting, they were not willing to risk appearing friendly to any foreigners, especially a Western woman.
During the series of banal speeches by the governor and two Afghan ministers that followed, the crowd grew audibly restless. These speeches failed to use any of the data we supplied; all the folders we worked around the clock to prepare, with talking points and statistics, remained unopened on the tables in front of them. The attendees were then invited to participate after the welcoming speeches, and Governor Daoud called on them one by one. The seemingly disengaged crowd suddenly agitated to attention. Applause grew vigorous as a succession of comments were shouted: “But there are still no alternatives to poppies” and, for the thousandth time, “Why not just raise the price of cotton?” The governor and his ministers took notes, sweating profusely about the head and neck. I watched the translator jot down the questions and ineffectual answers being tossed about, and felt dismayed.
The growing agitation in the room convinced me to grab my backpack and head outside to where our force protection was waiting. Before leaving, I asked the governor’s security detail where the Engineer’s British consultant was, the handpicked Pashto-fluent strategist who was supposed to help the governor manage the province in the face of growing instability. Apparently, this man had chosen to stay safely ensconced in the governor’s office down the street. At that moment, out of the meeting doors burst the governor and the Afghan ministers, followed by Western officials. We had no choice but to follow our hosts into the obligatory luncheon, where thirty people ate in virtual silence, criminals and spies undoubtedly among us.
And so we finished yet another pro forma meeting, the importance of which lay not in what it accomplished, but in the fact that it was held at all. Here in Helmand, appearances and honor—even false honor—were more important than progress. Could it be that this syndrome had seeped into the psyche of Americans and British as well? Whatever the answer, I was now ready to leave Afghanistan.
Nem egy optimista kép ugye? Arra itt van egy másik személyes történet Kandahárból, ahol egy francia vagy kanadai hölgy, sok évi újságíráskodás után, úgy döntött, hogy ott marad és megpróbál segíteni a helyieken. A természetes alapanyag okból készülő testápoló szer gyártó üzement próbálnak csinálni és egyenlőre működik a cég. Az elnevezésű - talán - termelőszövetkezet honlapját érdemes megnézni és még érdeksebb azokat a beszámolókat elolvasni, amiket évente egyszer kétszer Sarah Chayes ír. Ezek egyrészt bepillantás engednek a hétköznapokba, másrészt azt a meglepő képet mutatják, mintha Sarahnak nem is a biztonság okozná a legnagyobb problémát. Ami a segélyezés szempontjából érdekel minket az az 2006 júniusi írásában van (notes from the field). Néhány dolgot kiemelek, csak hogy képet kapjunk a jelenségről: August of last year ... Arghand won a contract from the lavishly funded (by USAID) "Alternative Livelihoods Program," implemented by one of these Beltway Bandits, called Chemonics. Just to give you an idea. Each of its employees makes $100,000-$190,000 plus 35% hazard pay, plus 35% "post differential," plus 20% for working on Saturdays. And Chemonics charges USAID $600,000 per person per year. In other words, is clearing more than 100% in profit.Although Arghand represents one of the few truly sustainable alternative livelihoods initiatives in the Afghan south, we were denied funding during the first year of operations. The reasons given were that ALP/South would be funding large-scale operations of a "proven business model," ALP/S was focusing on Helmand, not Kandahar Province (then why the huge staffed, vehicled, gardened office in Kandahar?)...
Elég arcpirító
Some days later, I received the surprise visit of two gentlemen, one a Chemonics vice president, the other the new head of Business Development Services, tailed by an entire vehicle of bullet-proof-vested, gun-toting "security" -- an accoutrement I had repeatedly told ALP/S was unacceptable in the current climate...
A fegyveresek akikről beszéltem. Nem részletezem tovább mert el kell olvasni az szerző összes bejegyezését. Sok mindenre rávilágit, s az ilyen írások visznek a legközelebb (a személyes élményeken kívül), ha meg akarjuk ismerni, hogy hogyan is él, dolgozik gondolkodik az afgánok egy kis része, és hogy egy működő projektnek is milyen problémákkal kell szembenéznie.
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